A Common Good Perspective on Diversity

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ABSTRACT: Drawing upon the theoretical debate on the concept of common good involving, in particular, Sison and Fontrodona (2012), I aim to show how the common good principle can serve as the basis for a new diversity perspective. Each of the three dominant diversity approaches—equality, diversity management, and inclusion—runs the ethical risk of focusing on community or individual levels, or on particular disciplines—economic, social, or moral. This article demonstrates that the common good principle could mitigate the ethical risks inherent to each of these diversity approaches. There are three positive aspects to a comprehensive common good perspective: 1) it includes considering different community levels, which it connects by subsidiarity, 2) it embraces the moral, social, and economic fields, which it connects by teleological hierarchy, and 3) it avoids the risk of exclusion by generating a sense of solidarity.

KEY WORDS: common good, diversity, diversity management, equality, inclusion, subsidiarity

One of the most popular topics in ethics, as can be seen from Business Ethics Quarterly (Solomon, 1992, 1998; Hartman, 1994; Koehn, 1995; Hartman, 2001; Gichure, 2006; Hartman, 2008; Sison, Hartman, & Fontrodona, 2012; Sison & Fontrodona, 2012; Moore, 2015; Kim, 2016; Sison, Ferrero, & Guitian, 2016; Sison, 2017), the common good seems to offer a new perspective capable of making judicious links between levels—society, organization, group, and individual—and between disciplines—namely moral, social, and economic. Based on the philosophical Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, the common good is a set of conditions that favor both the pursuit of a community good and the personal fulfillment of each member of the community (Melé, 2009; Sison, 2017; Sison, Ferrero, & Guitian, 2016; Sison & Fontrodona, 2012; Sison, Hartman, & Fontrodona, 2012). In contrast to reservations expressed by Deissenberg and Alvarez (2002) or De Bettignies and Lepineux (2009), certain authors, such as Melé, Sison, and Fontrodona, agree that the common good constitutes a central concept in business. It is sometimes even described as a principle (Melé, 2009), since it states that the flourishing of individuals is based on the flourishing of the community, thereby differing from the liberal principle that the pursuit of individual interests can lead to the good of the community.

I make it clear that the common good can be seen as a humanistic principle open to everyone whatever their spiritual convictions (Dierksmeier & Celano, 2012; Sison, Ferrero, & Guitian, 2016). Some ethicists have reached this conclusion, striving to distance themselves from a religious vocabulary and defining the common good as “that order of society in which every member enjoys the possibility of realizing his true self by participating in the effects of the cooperation of all” (Messner, 1965: 124).
Certain studies have qualified the common good as “a compass for managing and governing the business firm” (Melé, 2009: 238), likely to constitute a concrete principle for action (Frémeaux & Michelson, 2017; Melé, 2003; Sison & Fontrodona, 2012, 2013; Spitzeck, 2011). In particular, Sison and Fontrodona’s major study (2012) focused on the common good of the firm that they associated with work, providing its different members with an opportunity to both develop skills, virtues, and meaning, as well as respond to society needs. In this article, which is also devoted to the usefulness of the concept of common good, I take a slightly different approach. I have performed a scrupulous analysis of the existing diversity theories before moving on to the question of whether the common good can be a basis for a comprehensive view of diversity.

Diversity has gradually become an ethical topic of major importance that reflects new questions raised by the presence of women in the labor market, the demographic changes caused by migration, the globalization of trade, and increased awareness of environmental issues. More recently, the more economically developed countries have faced a growing backlash against immigration, in that right-wing parties and low-skilled workers fear that job opportunities and public aid benefit newcomers to the detriment of the indigenous populations (Delbridge & Sallaz, 2015; Klarsfeld, Ng, Booysen, Castro Christiansen, & Kuvaas, 2016). Given these significant shifts in economic and societal contexts, diversity research is at a critical juncture, inviting us to question the prevailing diversity approaches.

Thinking on diversity has evolved in response to changing circumstances. Three dominant diversity approaches correspond to overlapping historical stages (Litvin, 1997; Page, 2007; Zanoni & Janssens, 2007). In the United States, they are exemplified by “the equal opportunity-Civil Rights era of the 1960s, the diversity management/multiculturalism era of the 1980s and 90s, and today’s inclusion/post-race era” (Nkomo & Hoobler, 2014: 245). There are significant ethical limitations to these three approaches: the literature on equality tends to focus on membership groups (Thomas, 1990), research on managing diversity mostly concentrates on the economic dimension (Lorbiecki & Jack, 2000), and the literature on inclusion generally addresses individual situations (Roberson, 2006). On the basis of a bibliometric analysis of 13,896 publications in the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) from 1970 to 2009, Oswick and Noon (2014) denounce the compartmentalization of these approaches and expect future research to adopt a global view that includes the three areas of inquiry: “Rather than seeing the rationales for equality, diversity and inclusion as mutually exclusive, it could be more constructive to focus upon the points of commonality, overlap and compatibility” (36). Since “the common good acts as an integrative force on several different levels” (Sison & Fontrodona, 2012: 239), I propose to demonstrate that the common good principle could serve as a basis for an overarching perspective capable of combining these three diversity approaches.

The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The first section specifies the ethical risks inherent to each of these diversity approaches taken individually. The second section presents the literature on the common good principle, a concept that aims to address these risks, and shows how the common good principle could act as a
basis for a comprehensive diversity perspective. In the third section, I identify the ethical implications of our study and some areas for future research.

LITERATURE REVIEW ON DIVERSITY APPROACHES

Concepts Involved

The literature on diversity advocates for the consideration of differences in terms of affiliations or attributes. Thomas (1990) used the concept of affiliations to cover dimensions like race, ethnicity, gender, age, religion, educational level, geographic origin, and sexual orientation, along with other dimensions derived from the organizational context itself like job function, location, and tenure. Diversity was then defined as “the representation, in one social system, of people with distinctly different group affiliations of cultural significance” (Cox, 1993: 6) or “a mixture of people with different group identities within the same social system” (Nkomo and Cox, 1996: 339). Consistent with the study of Milliken and Martins (1996) and Joshi and Roh (2009), recent definitions of diversity have the merit of explicitly acknowledging both relations-oriented diversity attributes, such as gender, race/ethnicity, and age, and task-oriented diversity attributes, such as education, function, and tenure. However, Harrison, Price, and Bell (1998) assert that a diversity theorization also needs to cover deep-level diversity (differences in attitudes, beliefs, and values), which provides a fuller explanation for intergroup tension than does surface-level diversity (attributes such as sex, age, and race).

To encompass all the dimensions of diversity, Harrison and Klein (2007: 1200) propose that “diversity is not one thing but three things,” which are separation, variety, and disparity. Separation reflects differences in terms of opinion or position, primarily disagreement or opposition of values, beliefs, and attitudes. Variety means differences, in terms of knowledge or experience. Disparity evokes “differences in concentration of valued social assets or resources such as pay and status among unit members” (Harrison & Klein, 2007: 1200). The authors demonstrate that these diversity types are related at times and constitute a multilevel social construct. They “urge a more in-depth and comprehensive multilevel analysis of diversity” (1222), yet their view of the plurality of levels remains closely linked to the consideration of differences within groups.

This research stream on the differentiating characteristics of individuals and groups is grounded in the observation that diversity is a barrier to cooperation and the hope that cooperation can be achieved despite differences (Mayo et al., 2017; Ozbilgin & Tatli, 2008; Palmer, 2003; Pattnaik & Tripathy, 2014). Sociologists like Blalock (1967) assumed that social groups with different demographic categories tend to compete with each other rather than create cooperative behavior. Within firms, Guzzo and Shea (1992) assert that diversity in work teams would lead to disruptive conflicts. In the same way, within work teams diversity may stimulate competitive behavior among team members (Sanchez-Mazas, Roux, & Mugny, 1994). Conversely, social identity theory posits that people exhibit a favorable bias toward those that they consider members of their in-group (Turner & Haslam, 2001). In a homogeneous team, higher levels of in-group identification result in
cooperation, especially if cooperation is a priori consistent with each member’s self-interest (Kramer, 1991).

This observation that diversity impedes cooperation (Jackson, Joshi, & Erhardt, 2003) is not confirmed by empirical research, which has found mixed results on all the main dimensions of diversity: racial/ethnic, gender, age, disability, and culture (Shore et al., 2009). Indeed, with regard to the consequences of ethnic diversity, two opposing views emerged. The optimistic perspective is that ethnically diverse work teams make better decisions and work better than homogeneous teams (McLeod, Lobel, & Cox, 1996). In a more pessimistic perspective, ethnic diversity would have a negative impact on social integration and communication and would increase conflict (Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). Similarly, whereas Wood (1987) emphasized the higher performance of mixed gender groups, more recent literature suggests a negative effect on cohesion (Shapcott, Carron, Burke, Bradshaw, & Estabrooks, 2006). Notwithstanding the reservations made by Avolio, Waldman, and McDaniel (1990) about a link between age and inferior performance ratings, other studies found that older employees seem to integrate into firms less easily (Lawrence, 1988). Despite the fact that Miller and Werner (2005) showed superior performance ratings for disabled people, there is also a tendency toward inconsistent results. Lastly, whereas cultural differences influence cooperation outcomes, the nature of the effects, i.e., negative or positive, is debatable (Barinaga, 2007).

The only point on which these scholars agree is that relational, social, and organizational context can attenuate or strengthen the impact of strong diversity (Ely & Roberts, 2008; Joshi & Roh, 2009; Meister, Jehn, & Thatcher, 2014; Turner & Haslam, 2001). For example, firms “that combine strong organizational identification with a multicultural ideology might be better positioned to draw on their multicultural employees’ skills as a valuable resource” (Fitzsimmons, 2013: 545). Therefore, existing diversity approaches have used the concepts of differences, attributes/affiliations, and cooperation in order to delineate how to foster cooperation between individuals with different diversity attributes.

Three Dominant Approaches to Diversity

Equality, diversity management, and inclusion are classified as the three antidiscriminatory approaches (Litvin, 1997; Nkomo & Hoobler, 2014; Page, 2007; Zanoni & Janssens, 2007). Oswick and Noon (2014) show that diversity management accounted for 54 percent of the aggregated total, whereas equality represented 33 percent and inclusion accounted for 13 percent of the total corpus. Even if the literature on inclusion continues to expand, diversity management remains the most popular area of research.

Emerging in the 1960s, the first approach to diversity based on equality, which has leveraged civil rights and justice arguments, is rooted in a deontological approach focused on universal moral duty. The purpose of this first perspective has essentially been to provide equal opportunities and to develop affirmative action initiatives, including quotas and preferential selection, in order to secure access to organizations,
particularly for women and ethnic minorities. Since the early 1980s, the second approach to diversity called “diversity management” has used utilitarian arguments, with the aim of developing an appropriate response to meet the needs of demographic and competitive challenges. In this perspective focused on outcomes, diversity is only valued because it fosters greater innovation, better problem-solving, and a higher level of employee retention. The third approach based on inclusion has emerged more recently with the twin objectives of avoiding an excessive focus on characteristics, which can be stereotyped, and of incorporating differences into business practices by recognizing the work contribution of everyone.

The points of divergence between these approaches have been accentuated by the literature. Indeed, equal opportunities and diversity management have been delineated (Kandola, Fullerton, & Ahmed, 1995; Liff, 1999; Liff & Wajcman, 1996). Linnehan and Konrad (1999) have observed that “many authors explicitly distance diversity from affirmative action programs, and some openly malign affirmative action” (400). Thomas (1990) had suggested that affirmative action based on equality had to be replaced with managing diversity, which is more open to all kinds of differences and more based on voluntarism in order to satisfy business needs. This call was supported by Kandola and Fullerton (1994), Ross and Schneider (1992), Thomas and Ely (1996), and Kelly and Dobbin (1998). Affirmative action has been described as “old, tired, failing and reliant” on regulations imposed by the government, while managing diversity has been portrayed as “new, fresh, and full of potential” (Oswick & Noon, 2014: 25). In seeking to differentiate itself from the basic principle of equal rights (Edelman, Fuller, & Maria-Drita, 2001), managing diversity turned to an economic approach based on improved performance (Ali & Konrad, 2017; Cox, 1993; Lorbiecki & Jack, 2000). Spreading into many countries across the world, it has become a set of organizational systems and managerial practices, intended to maximize the potential advantages of diversity, while minimizing its potential disadvantages (Ozbilgin & Tatli, 2008; Palmer, 2003; Pattnaik & Tripathy, 2014).

Equally, inclusion, and diversity management have been also distinguished from each other (Bendick, Egan, & Lanier, 2010; Roberson, 2006; Shore et al., 2011). Differentiating criteria between diversity management and inclusion were highlighted by some academic scholars (Chavez & Weisinger, 2008; Roberson, 2006): whereas a diversity approach focuses on “recognizing the value of differences within the workforce and managing them for commercial advantage,” an inclusion approach addresses “the processes that incorporate differences into business practices,” in particular the process of enhancing the skills, knowledge, and capabilities of individuals to perform work tasks effectively (Oswick & Noon, 2014: 26). Inclusion could even be part of the backlash against diversity initiatives judged to be focused on social groups rather than individuals. For example, a diversity approach implies considering the demographic composition of groups, while an inclusion approach is concerned with the “removal of obstacles to the full participation and contribution of employees” (Roberson, 2006: 217). This explains why the emergence of positive studies around the notion of inclusion (Miller & Katz, 2002) coincided with the critical literature on the “fatal flaws of diversity” (Noon, 2007: 773).
Tensions Generated

If these three approaches appear simplistic when they are considered purely as fashions (Oswick & Noon, 2014), they have the merit of highlighting three tensions inherent to diversity.

First, the shift from equality to diversity management aims to overcome the tensions inherent to the concept of equality (Özbilgin & Tatli, 2011; Tatli, 2011; Zanoni, Janssens, & Benschop, 2010). To promote equal rights, the United States implemented affirmative action policies intended to enable discriminated-against minorities to improve their chances of success. Affirmative action may lead to the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, and religion and to the implementation of employment quotas for disadvantaged groups. However, practices of positive discrimination, in particular quota systems, are also criticized in relation to equality, in that they may exacerbate rather than relieve tensions between groups (Dworkin, 2002). Therefore, some diversity measures risk adopting an excessively category-based approach that could ultimately undermine equality.

Second, the shift from diversity management to inclusion aims to overcome the tensions inherent to diversity management. The study carried out by McKinsey & Company (Hunt, Layton, & Prince, 2015) called “Diversity Matters” reports that companies in the top quartile for gender or racial and ethnic diversity are more likely to have financial returns above their national industry medians. However, other research streams denounce this approach, which they consider a manifestation of neoliberal thinking, and wish to connect diversity practices with moral values and social justice. They strive to avoid an economic instrumentalization of diversity by making the diversified workforce an organizational goal (Kochan et al., 2003; Konrad, 2003; Wrench, 2007), or by viewing managing diversity as a means of achieving a higher purpose and not simply as an end in itself (Nkomo, 1997).

Third, in the recent literature (Oswick & Noon, 2014), inclusion is also questioned because it does not present all the advantages of the other antidiscrimination solutions. Specifically, it focuses on individuals, which is problematic, and thus risks neglecting the interests of groups. Consequently, the inclusion logic can paradoxically result in excluding groups and other individuals. In Europe, for example, this tension is increased by the issues of establishing prayer spaces in the workplace, respecting dietary prohibitions, taking into account periods of fasting, or permitting the wearing of religious symbols. The question is to what extent should a response to identity claims be universal in scope (Ferdman, 2017; Zanoni & Janssens, 2004, 2015) and in which cases does responding positively to the needs of some individuals preserve the universality of rights.

Risks Entailed

The three areas of tensions reveal three main ethical risks: the risk of categorizing the target group, the risk of instrumentalizing diversity, and the risk of excluding other groups.
The Risk of Categorizing the Target Group

Tatli and Özbilgin (2012) denounced the category-based approach that leads to enclosing the target groups in rigid categories and to focusing more on visible measures than on management devices that should accompany them. Some measures are both visible and artificial. For example, actions aimed at encouraging workers in post to declare their disabilities have the effect of increasing the rate of people with disabilities within the organization, but do not necessarily help these workers to receive additional support in the organization of their work. Similarly, some organizations choose to highlight the increased number of women on boards of directors, while masking the low rate of women on other management committees. Moreover, the creation of devalued tasks or posts that do not require specific skills for certain target groups, such as women, people with disabilities, or seniors, can increase stigmatization that would be inconsistent with the initial purpose of the process. Events that emphasize the support management provides to the most vulnerable employees do not necessarily help them to feel integrated in the community. These measures have in common the desire to promote the quantitative importance of the visible minorities and to orchestrate exclusively positive stories about the company. By focusing on visible diversity, the category-based approach risks neglecting invisible diversity, related to social background or sexual orientation, for example (Bell, Özbilgin, Beauregard, & Sürgevil, 2011; Bowen & Blackmon, 2003). These diversity management programs may lead to a “reverse discrimination” backlash and raise sensitive issues by facilitating the conflict between categories of interests (Kalev, Kelly, & Dobbin, 2006; Kidder, Lankau, Chrobot-Mason, Mollica, & Friedman, 2004).

The Risk of Instrumentalizing Diversity

Many authors have underlined that organizations need to acknowledge the economic value of differences, in order to put an end to inequalities (Prasad, Pringle, & Konrad, 2006). Cox and Blake (1991) argued that diversity management could increase job satisfaction, along with employee loyalty and creativity, within organizations. Milliken and Martins (1996) presented a synthesis of the multiple effects of diversity in terms of turnover, commitment, satisfaction, creativity, communication, and economic performance. The recent data analysis of Tuan, Rowley, and Thao (2019) supported the positive relationship between diversity-oriented human resource management and work engagement among employees. In contrast, Harrison and Klein (2007) underscored the fact that the economic impact of diversity is highly variable and depends on contextual factors. For example, board gender diversity can propel strategic change only in the event of high firm performance (Del Carmen, Miller, & Trzebiatowski, 2014). Heterogenous groups may lead to better performance if heterogeneity involves all the hierarchical levels (Bishop & Hou, 2015). But critical diversity management research has found fault with this instrumental vision of diversity, one in which differences can be exploited (Özbilgin & Tatli, 2011; Zanoni, 2011). This strand of research distances itself from the economic objective by addressing diversity management as a way to help employees to cooperate, and by
considering that cooperation as grounded in interpersonal and social interactions rather than utility maximization.

The Risk of Excluding Others

Diversity actions may marginalize groups by separating them or contrasting them with other groups. Diversity should be based on a political, managerial, and organizational vision that promotes inclusion, because managing diversity is fundamentally “a comprehensive managerial process for developing an environment that works for all employees” (Thomas, 1991: 10). According to Roberson (2006), inclusion represents an “identity-blind approach” that focuses on individual participation in decision-making regardless of group identity rather than an “identity-conscious approach” that takes group identity into account. Shore et al. (2011) propose a model of inclusion where an individual who is in a position to balance both belongingness and uniqueness can feel included. This focus on the individual situation may undermine the collective dynamics that are potentially the most efficient ways of fighting against exclusion (Oswick & Noon, 2014).

Ideas, tensions, and risks inherent to these three dominant diversity approaches are summarized in Table 1.

The Need for a New Diversity Perspective

Some scholars regret that existing research has tended to oppose the diversity approaches rather than develop a wider and more comprehensive perspective on diversity (Oswick & Noon, 2014). By opposing the foundations of diversity—equality, managing diversity, inclusion—researchers have been prone to participate in a fragmented, conflictual, and confused vision of diversity that has led them to an excessive focus on the quantitative importance of minorities, on the economic value of differences, and on the inclusion of some individuals. For example, Kirton and Greene’s (2000) observations based on both the comparison of concepts and empirical evidence lead them to argue that many differences between equality and diversity management have been exaggerated. Most diversity initiatives are rooted in equal opportunity approaches, and economic rationales have been used to justify equal opportunity initiatives (Noon, 2007). Likewise, Roberson (2006) recognizes that the shift from diversity to inclusion constitutes a change in language more than any real change in diversity practices. The fight against exclusion was already the inherent objective of managing diversity, which has a “positive starting point” that “embraces everyone” (Kandola, Fullerton, & Ahmed, 1995: 31–32; see also Buengeler, Leroy, & De Stobbeleir, 2018; Buse, Bernstein, & Bilimoria, 2016; Dobusch, 2017; Mitchell et al. 2015). Oswick and Noon (2014) denounce the artificial tendency to consider diversity management as superior to equality and inclusion as a progressive step that goes beyond diversity management. They underline that “anti-discrimination approaches can be seen as synchronic because they can coexist and operate in parallel with each other,” demonstrating that equality-based mechanisms and penalties can be combined with diversity-based initiatives (Oswick & Noon, 2014: 36). These scholars suggest a possible synergy between the different
Table 1: Ideas, Tensions, and Risks Inherent to Dominant Diversity Approaches

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<th>Foundations of diversity</th>
<th>Ideas</th>
<th>Tensions</th>
<th>Risks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equality</strong></td>
<td>• Deontological arguments</td>
<td>To ensure equality, promoting the quantitative importance of minorities could increase conflict between categories of interest</td>
<td>Risk of categorizing target groups</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Preserving equal rights</td>
<td>Bowen &amp; Blackman (2003); Zanoni et al. (2010); Bell et al. (2011); Tatli (2011); Özbilgin &amp; Tatli (2011)</td>
<td>Kidder et al. (2004); Kalev et al. (2006); Tatli &amp; Özbilgin (2012)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Affirmative action programs</td>
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<td>• Reliance on regulation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Search for numerical representation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Focusing on minorities</td>
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<td>Thomas (1990)</td>
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<td>Thomas and Ely (1996)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Managing diversity</strong></td>
<td>• Utilitarian arguments</td>
<td>To further diversity management, promoting the economic value of differences could lead actors to neglect the question of how to cooperate</td>
<td>Risk of instrumentalizing diversity</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Satisfying business needs</td>
<td>Nkomo (1997); Edelman, Fuller &amp; Maria Drita (2001); Falmer (2003); Kochan et al. (2003); Konrad (2003); Wrench (2007); Dobusch (2017)</td>
<td>Lorbiecki &amp; Jack (2000); Özbilgin &amp; Tatli (2008, 2011); Zanoni et al. (2011); Pattnaik &amp; Tripathy (2014)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Maximizing the potential advantages of diversity</td>
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<td>• Self-regulation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Focusing on social groups</td>
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<td>Cox &amp; Blake (1991); Ross &amp; Schneider (1992); Cox (1993); Kandola &amp; Fullerton (1994); Thomas &amp; Ely (1996); Milliken &amp; Martins (1996); Kelly &amp; Dobbin (1998); Liff (1999); Linnehan &amp; Konrad (1999); Prasad, Pringle &amp; Konrad (2006); Harrison &amp; Klein (2007); Ali &amp; Konrad (2017); Tuan, Rowley, &amp; Thao (2019)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Inclusion</strong></td>
<td>• Fostering full participation of employees</td>
<td>Promoting inclusion of individuals could lead to neglecting the question of how to include groups</td>
<td>Risk of excluding others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Enhancing the skills and knowledge needed to take part in society and in business life</td>
<td>Zanoni &amp; Janssens (2004, 2007); Ferdman (2017)</td>
<td>Oswick &amp; Noon (2014)</td>
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<td>• Focusing on individuals</td>
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<td>Miller &amp; Katz (2002); Roberson (2006); Bendick, Egan, &amp; Lanier (2010); Shore et al. (2011)</td>
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antidiscrimination solutions in order to avoid the ethical risks inherent to a focus on each of them individually.

To conclude, there is a need for a new diversity perspective that could address diversity at all levels—individual, group, organization, and society—from an interdisciplinary perspective, and overcome the ethical risks inherent to existing diversity programs, namely categorizing, instrumentalizing, and excluding. The next section will examine why and how the common good principle could serve as a basis for this new diversity perspective.

THE RELEVANCE OF A COMPREHENSIVE DIVERSITY PERSPECTIVE BASED ON THE COMMON GOOD PRINCIPLE

The concept of common good has led to multiple interpretations ranging from Machiavelli’s political perspective (1531), based on a free way of style, to the utilitarian economic approach, which tends to consider the common good as the sum of individual goods. The concept analyzed in our study differs from these interpretations and also from the commons theory initiated by Ostrom (1990), which focused on the theme of cooperation in self-organized systems (Ostrom, 2000). Because of its potential to embrace all organizations, all disciplines, and all levels, I have chosen to draw on the common good principle based on Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy.


Sison and Fontrodona (2012) chose to draw from three main philosophical sources—the ethics of Aristotle, the ethics of Aquinas, and the Catholic Social Thought—enabling them to relate the concept of common good to work. Indeed, these scholars qualified work as a “locus of meaning, relationship and cooperation” (2012: 231) and defined the common good of the firm as “the work that allows human beings not only to produce goods and services (the objective dimension), but more importantly, to develop technical or artistic skills and intellectual and moral virtues (the subjective dimension)” (2012: 230). Sison, Ferrero, and Guitian (2016) specified that work can be a common good, as it is an opportunity for experiencing virtues, what Solomon (1992: 327) had described as “excellences,” and that News-tead, Macklin, Dawkins, and Martin (2018: 446) more recently defined as “the human inclination to feel, think, and act in ways that express moral excellence and contribute to the common good.”

In Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, the common good is associated with the concepts of happiness, or eudaimonia, which consists of a good life shared with other people in a group. Happiness is complete and self-sufficient, and refers to goods pursued in themselves (Kim, 2016; Sison & Fontrodona, 2012; Smith, 1995;
Walshe, 2006). The common good is also closely linked to the concept of human dignity, because it is both the goal and the result of the development of dignity (Sison & Fontrodona, 2012, 2013; Walshe, 2006). Human dignity of all people and of the whole person individually presents three characteristics specified by Sison, Ferrero, and Guitian (2016: 511): it is an inherent, “intrinsic, irreducible and indestructible quality found equally in all human beings.” The different concepts related to the common good can be combined in the following way: the common good supports and embodies the happiness that people who develop their human dignity may attain by living virtuously. From these concepts, I can identify specific features of the common good principle enabling it to serve as a basis for a new diversity perspective.

Firstly, the common good principle involves different community and individual levels, referring to the good of society, and other forms of social life, but also to the good of the individuals. This is due to the fact that the common good principle is based on a personalist approach strongly supported by Maritain (1947) and Mounier (1970) in which community enables the individual to become a human person (Buber, 1937), thereby offering the advantage of connecting the community and individual levels. This approach is not abstract but rather concrete and realistic, rooted in consideration of the relational dimension of the human person, who can see in others not the threat of dispossession but the opportunity to cooperate (Mounier, 1970). The more the common good is pursued and attained, the more likely it is that the individual will conform to his or her deeply communitarian nature (Acevedo, 2012; Sison, Ferrero, & Guitian, 2016). Two main community levels structure ethical thinking: the firm and the political community. These two communities are different but interconnected: organizations are actually “the primary form of association and identification” (Hartman, 2008: 261), through which their members can pursue the common good of the society and contribute to their ultimate flourishing in the political community. As Sison and Fontrodona (2012: 225) argued, “the production of goods and services by businesses, therefore, is not self-justifying; but desirable only insofar as it contributes, in the final instance, to a flourishing life in the State.”

Secondly, the common good principle entails a descriptive dimension that refers to community-based cooperation, and a prescriptive dimension that is based on the moral duty to contribute to the common good (O’Brien, 2009). Unlike complementary cooperation, which is based on the need for resources and lasts for as long as the individuals calculate that their gains exceed their losses (Dameron & Joffre, 2007), community-based cooperation tends to be observed in limited groups, gathered around shared aims within a space of interaction with other groups, and in which each member feels a sense of moral duty.

Thirdly, the common good should not be understood as the highest and most transcendental good, but rather as a complex representation of the order of society, reflecting subtle relationships between disciplines. Indeed, the common good principle offers an interdisciplinary perspective by considering and connecting the economic, social, moral, and environmental conditions: “economic conditions that allow everyone to enjoy a reasonable level of wellbeing”; social conditions conducive to “respect for human freedom, justice and solidarity”; moral values shared in a
community, “including respect for human dignity and human rights in connection with personalism”; and environmental conditions “that aim to maintain appropriate living conditions for current and future generations” (Melé, 2009: 236).

Fourthly, as outlined by Sison and Fontrodona (2012), who drew inspiration from Aquinas, the common good entails a “formal” part, which is a constitutive element of every society, and a “material” part, which refers to the particular circumstances of each society. The formal part of the common good covers conditions related to an anthropological dimension, such as the orientation of the human person toward other human persons and the fundamental equality of all human persons (Barrera, 2001), while the material dimension of the common good refers to different ways, related to time and space, of contributing to the common good (Frémeaux & Michelson, 2017).

Drawing on this multilevel, descriptive, prescriptive, interdisciplinary, formal, and contextual vision of good, the common good principle may attenuate the three ethical risks: categorizing groups, instrumentalizing diversity, and excluding others. This principle is not an alternative to the three existing approaches to diversity, it both integrates and transcends the different diversity approaches. It transcends the category-based approach by going beyond a recognition of the different categories of interests, and offering the awareness that, for anthropological reasons, human beings need to be decentralized from themselves and turned toward the expanded community good. The common good principle also transcends the instrumental approach by explicitly setting human and virtue development as an objective, and by proposing a dialectic of ends and means: profit, capital, or technological development are explicitly seen as necessary means and not as objectives. Lastly, the common good principle avoids the exclusion logic, because it is based on the assumption that by pursuing a community good turned toward human development, individuals tend to achieve their personal good more fully (Frémeaux, Puyou, & Michelson, 2018). It involves all members of the community, proclaims that no person and no category of individuals can be ruled out, and encourages all the members of the community to pursue the desire to oppose exclusion (Melé, 2012). The common good principle differs in this respect from the political and legal concept of common interest (Melé, 2009), which would justify the sacrifice of the inalienable rights of individuals to ensure the survival of or defend the interests of the majority. The search for the common good may begin with awareness of the common interest as a protection against the misuse of power, but the common good principle goes further by considering the personal good of each member of the group. Argandona (1998) distinguishes between particular good, collective good, and common good in order to explain that unlike a particular good possessed by a single person or a limited number of people to the exclusion of all others, or a collective good possessed by a collective but not shared by all, a common good can be shared by all and at the same time be personally possessed.

The common good principle can therefore be defined as a set of conditions allowing a clear connection between the three concepts—community good, human development, and personal good: 1) individuals can become more human only when they pursue a community good; 2) they can search for a community good only if this
good respects human development; and 3) human development implies that the personal good of each member is considered.

The common good principle postulates that by contributing to a community good that respects human development while taking into consideration the personal good of any member, individuals with different attributes can cooperate more effectively. This raises three questions about the concepts involved: What community good should be taken into account? How can the community good favor human development? And how can we make sure that no one is excluded? The concepts of subsidiarity, teleological hierarchy, and solidarity can be considered clear responses to these questions enabling the avoidance or the mitigation of risks inherent to reductionist views of diversity.

Subsidiarity
The common good principle advocates considering all community levels and all forms of community, in particular firms and political communities (Melé, 2005). Firms are distinct from families or political communities that Aristotle described as “natural” and “perfect” societies on the basis that they are self-sufficing, and that all people, by nature or by necessity, belong to them (Politics, 1252b). Firms are “artificial and imperfect societies,” because they are not self-sufficing and “do not arise directly from human nature in the same necessary way that families or political communities do” (Sison & Fontrodona, 2012: 221). As a result, business organizations are “intermediate bodies” situated between families and political communities. This means that the economic ends that business organizations seek are means to a higher political end, contributing to a flourishing life in the state (2012: 225).

The subsidiary exercise of authority is defined as a recognition of autonomy allowing members of social groups to do what they can do at their own level of responsibility, but subsidiarity is not limited to the granting of greater autonomy (Melé, 2005). I would say, in pedagogical terms, that subsidiarity postulates three complementary orientations: a granting of autonomy, a unity of purpose, and a development of cooperation. Just as the state should encourage private and lower-level initiatives to respond to societal needs, managers should grant employees the means and autonomy to achieve strategic and societal objectives. Subsidiarity also encourages integration of different community levels by providing clear guidance on common objectives. Sison (2003) and Gichure (2006) used the term of moral capital to evoke this orientation, enabling the members of a community to share a “unity of end or purpose” (Sison & Fontrodona, 2012: 227). Integrating a plurality of community reference points in a logical structure, this diversity perspective does not present the risk of legitimizing a dispersion and thereby an uprooting, whereby people are distanced from their humanity. Instead, it promotes rooting, which is even more important given that it involves a multiplicity of community reference points (Weil, 1987 [1952]). The concept of community good is not “a buzz-word, an excuse for the persecution and/or exclusion of minorities, a plea for protection, a demand for immunity and isolation” (Solomon, 1994: 276) but “an open-ended and immensely complex set of relationships between its members”
that may result in a genuine good (277). Lastly, the concept of subsidiarity as presented by Sison and Fontrodona is not simply restricted to the granting of autonomy and to the clarification of common purpose; it also relates to cooperation and more particularly to the time dedicated to dialogue (2012: 214; Kim, 2016). Based on a positive vision of authority, etymologically derived from the classical Latin, Auctoritas and Auctor, meaning both to nurture and to be author, the subsidiary exercise of authority would therefore enable each member of an organization to receive and transmit autonomy, guidance, and cooperation.

Concretely, in the field of diversity, the subsidiarity exercise of authority tends to facilitate the community integration of individuals with different attributes by providing them with spaces of freedom, a clear framework, and cooperation areas. The concept of subsidiarity reminds every minority—concerned with creating community life and developing a sense of solidarity to preserve their rights, culture, traditions, and religion—that their requests should necessarily be integrated into a community embeddedness, enabling them to contribute to their flourishing life in the society. The principle of subsidiarity leads us to consider the potential and actual contribution of everyone in the communities rather than focusing on the composition of the groups.

**Teleological Hierarchy**

Not only does the common good principle draw on different disciplines, but these disciplines are interlinked by a teleological hierarchy. Firstly, material and economic considerations act as a foundation for the other levels (Alford & Naughton, 2001, 2002; Melé, 2002; Naughton, Alford, & Brady, 1995). Secondly, legal and political aspects give guidance to organizations. Thirdly, culture, ethics, and spirituality ensure that all the levels are committed to the same purpose, namely human development (Hartman, 1994, 2008; Moore, 2015). Kennedy (2006) also participated in the development of this teleological hierarchy by stating that to be morally legitimate, the common goods pursued by business firms must be real and not merely apparent, echoing Alford and Naughton’s (2001) distinction between excellent goods and foundational goods. As Sison and Fontrodona (2012: 235) contend, “it would be wrong to pay attention to governance (second level) only when certain profit objectives (first level) have been surpassed, or to consider the cultural development of workers (third level) only when there are no labor conflicts (second level).” Whatever the difficulties or the constraints encountered, the finality of a community remains the development of each member.

Therefore, debates and concerns about the economic performance of diversity, while necessary, should not supplant the ethical issue of how a diversity program can contribute to human development by responding to the societal and human needs. This teleological hierarchy would allow a freer exploration of the different ways of contributing to the common good by going beyond the analysis of financial costs and benefits of conventional diversity policies. In concrete terms, a diversity program whose costs exceed benefits might be launched for ethical, social, or environmental reasons.
Solidarity

Pursuit of the common good is encouraged by the principle of solidarity, whereby all members of a community have a responsibility to each other, enabling each of them “to have access to the necessary goods and services for a dignified life” (Arjoon, Turriago-Hoyos, & Thoene, 2018: 155). Solidarity is manifested by the awareness of interdependence between people and a commitment to entering into cooperation (Kelly, 2004). By considering solidarity as a foundation of cooperation alongside subsidiarity, Cremers (2017: 717) underlines that “our right to have our dignity respected by others is irrevocably linked to our duty to respect the dignity of others.” According to Arjoon, Turriago-Hoyos, and Thoene (2018: 155), the principle of solidarity implies more specifically that “each person is obliged to contribute to the common good through personal responsibility and cooperation.”

The duty of each member of a community to contribute to the common good is explained by Sison and Fontrodona (2012) through the importance of each individual contribution without which the community could not be formed. For this purpose, they describe the common good of the firm as an “integral whole” consisting of “formal” and “actual” parts on the one hand, and “material” and “potential” parts on the other. Workers are “actual,” because their particular contribution to the common productive process cannot be replaced by the efforts of others, while financial capital and equipment are “potential,” because they can easily be substituted by any other similar resources. Since the common productive process would not be the same without every one of the workers, the formation of a community of workers is based on the moral duty to foster inclusion and to combat exclusion. Sison and Fontrodona (2012: 233) also used the concept of justice as the social virtue par excellence in order to distinguish between distributive justice, which refers to “the duties of the whole (community) to its parts (members),” and contributive justice, which reflects “the duties of the parts to the whole.” This means that at every level of responsibility, “the enjoyment of certain rights entails the fulfillment of duties and obligations” (Sison & Fontrodona, 2012: 233).

Therefore, being an actual part of a business firm, each worker is “someone” unique and part of the community in a specific way (Spaemann, 2006). Each request merits a particular consideration, provided that the authors of the request devote a similar level of attention to the aspirations of the other members or other groups of the community in order to foster their integration and participation. A diversity theory based on the common good principle could help combat exclusion by requiring everyone to respect diversity before being entitled to benefit from diversity.

Table 2 specifies the characteristics and the practical qualities of the common good principle and outlines how subsidiarity, teleological hierarchy, and solidarity can help mitigate the inherent ethical risks of dominant diversity theories.

ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS

This study contributes to debate on the role of common good, rehabilitating the concept as a basis for economic, political, and moral thinking. Indeed, past research has tended to overlook the common good as the ultimate goal, leading individuals to
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focus instead on another common language to experience stronger cohesion—that of the natural disposition of the individual to act according to collective and individual interests. The logic of interest leads people to want more (Mauss, 1967) and, at the organizational level, to promote the economic purpose exclusively. Constant (1988) denounced this lack of consideration for the common good, deploring the fact that the purpose is no longer to protect the common good but to provide fulfillment for everyone by serving collective and individual interests. I have addressed this critical constraint by suggesting a new diversity perspective based on the common good principle, which would have the advantage of circumventing the tendency, inherent to the three existing diversity approaches taken individually, to focus on differences by recognizing them, instrumentalizing them, or fostering them (Özbilgin & Tatli, 2008, 2011; Pattnaik & Tripathy, 2014; Tatli & Özbilgin, 2012; Zanoni et al., 2011). For this purpose, this study has concerned commonalities and, more specifically, the possible shared human aspiration to participate in an embedded community good, in human development, and in the personal good of each member.

This new perspective contributes to literature on diversity by proposing not a fourth view that could be seen as a substitute for existing approaches, but a global one, which authorizes an ethical reconsideration of the first three approaches. Indeed, whereas a deontological approach based on equality and a utilitarian approach focused on outcomes seem to be oppositional, this study offers a new perspective capable of associating these two approaches while taking into account the more individualistic view based on inclusion. It also incorporates all the recent theoretical propositions, which question the strictly utilitarian approach as the basis of business ethics, such as the virtue ethics suggested by Van Dijk, Van Eugen, and Paauwe (2012), or the ethic of care evoked by Wallace, Hoover, and Pepper (2014), which acknowledges each individual’s uniqueness and considers the ethic of care as an ideal orientation for the different members of an organization (O’Brien, 2009). Therefore, responding to the expectations of Oswick and Noon (2014), this new perspective is capable of combining the conventional approaches to diversity for three reasons.

First, this perspective helps give a transcendental meaning to diversity programs, which reduces the inherent risks of existing diversity approaches while taking into account the deep value of each of these approaches. The embedded communities resulting from subsidiarity may help overcome categorical logic inherent to affirmative action programs while emphasizing an equal right to participate in a wider community good. The pursuit of economic, social, moral, and environmental objectives in accordance with teleological hierarchy may help avoid economic instrumentalization logic while authorizing a strong consideration of economic constraints. The idea that duties are associated with rights may weaken the risks of exclusion and fit perfectly into an inclusion-based approach. In other terms, the three diversity approaches—equality, diversity management, and inclusion—are integrated in this new antidiscrimination perspective, but take on a new significance: equal rights involve equal community participation within the organization and the society; the economic dimension is valued as a necessary means in the service of higher objectives; inclusion becomes an objective justifying the development of individual and collective duties.
Second, this new diversity perspective calls for an analysis on a case-by-case basis of the initiatives and requests based on diversity. This factual and comprehensive analysis may be close to the notion of reasonable accommodation used in North America, whereby a measure of diversity may be allowed, provided that it does not impose unreasonable costs on the company, and that it does not lead to negative consequences for other employees. Inversely, if an identity-related need creates disorder (e.g., disruption in work organization or deterioration in the quality of work), managers can intervene and oppose the request not by invoking the identity-linked motive, but by considering in a more objective manner the risk of disrupting business activity and of losing sight of the transcendental aim.

Third, this perspective of diversity encourages extended deliberation within organizations about the different ways of doing one’s work while pursuing the common good. Arenas of cooperation dedicated to the issues and to the measures of diversity are opportunities for taking into account the community embeddedness (and not only the needs of some categories of individuals), the societal objectives (and not only the economic and organizational needs), and the vulnerability of each person (and not only the specific difficulties of some individuals).

Therefore, this common good perspective on diversity is distinguished from the other diversity approaches in supporting the following concrete orientations within organizations. All those concerned with preserving diversity can avoid an extreme focus on restricted categories of individuals in order to concentrate on improving working conditions for all, clarifying the societal utility of everyone’s work, and welcoming the quality with which the work is actually done. They may also refrain from explicitly using vulnerability as a lever to increase economic performance and ensure that the diversity policies put in place do not make those directly concerned feel uncomfortable. Even measures accomplished for positive purposes, such as shift or schedule arrangements, when granted on an exceptional basis following long and difficult procedures, can be experienced by all members of the organization as favors or communication measures that do not aid inclusion. Rather, inclusion programs carried out in the common good perspective are based on the attention paid to each person regardless of their attributes, enabling them to experience the satisfaction of a job well done and the participation in social relationships. These programs also involve the recognition and the promotion of collective achievements, which have as their objective the pursuit of the common good.

The most characteristic economic movement of this common good perspective on diversity may be the economy of communion (Bruni, 2002; Bruni & Zamagni, 2004; Gallagher & Buckeye, 2014; Lubich, 2001), which has the explicit objective of pursuing the common good through the implementation of an inclusive work organization and the sharing of profits with people in need, most often those living in close proximity to these organizations. While these companies must ensure their survival and economic development, they share a desire to transcend the material goals by pursuing a broader community good that contributes to human development (Frémeaux & Michelson, 2017). In line with the principle of subsidiarity, the economy of communion is less a set of structures than a community of people who have joined a common project, that of helping those in need, and who do what they
can at their level of responsibility in order to spread the culture of sharing. In accordance with the teleological hierarchy principle, these firms aim to meet real societal needs by offering goods that are truly good and services that truly serve (Gallagher & Buskeye, 2014). They also put in place effective solidarity mechanisms based on the culture of giving and mutual assistance that further benefit all the members of the organization in that they include and welcome the most deprived people. Hence, these economy-of-communion organizations can be viewed as communities of persons with different attributes that are capable of pursuing higher objectives—responding to societal needs, aiding the poorest, and fostering the development through work (Akrivou & Sison, 2016; Gustafson, 2018).

This study also enriches literature on the common good by showing how the common good principle can be a concrete principle for action in the particular field of diversity. I therefore respond to the aspiration expressed by Sison and Fontrodona (2012: 241) that “an operational managerial paradigm has to be designed based on the new anthropological, political, economic and ethical premises that the common good supplies.” By examining the theoretical and practical implications of subsidiarity, teleological hierarchy, and solidarity, I participate in the development of research on the scope and the practical usefulness of the common good principle (Frémeaux & Michelson, 2017; Melé, 2003; Sison & Fontrodona, 2012, 2013; Spitzeck, 2011).

There would be a risk involved in searching for a unique definition of the common good: “A danger exists within the common good tradition of seeking unity at the expense of diversity, solidarity at the expense of opposition, and community at the expense of individuality, all of which eventually undermine the common good” (Naughton et al., 1995: 233). However, the current globalization and the existence of an increasingly interconnected world are pragmatic reasons for advocating an ethics that transcends divergent ideologies (Bok, 2002; Hsieh, 2017; Kennedy, Kim, & Strudler, 2016; Melé & Sanchez-Runde, 2013) and, more particularly, an ethics based on practical wisdom as described in the Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy. This practical wisdom presupposes a habit of mind consisting in considering in the first place what goals are worth pursuing and are conducive to a good life for oneself and one’s community, and subsequently in finding fitting means to accomplish the end pursued (Beabout, 2012). This involves the ability to develop excellent habits of deliberation, judgment, and execution while keeping in mind the pursuit of the common good (Beabout, 2012; Sison, Hartman, & Fontrodona, 2012). I thus propose to consider the common good principle not as a set of static values, rules, and principles that apply to all but as a way of thinking and acting based on subsidiarity, teleological hierarchy, and solidarity that makes cooperation possible between individuals with diverse attributes.

I can note at this stage of the analysis that subsidiarity, teleological hierarchy, and solidarity may be easier to implement within small communities sharing an awareness of the community nature of human beings, moral values, high societal objectives, and a desire for internal and external cooperation. These predisposing conditions can encourage the members of a community to rediscover the goods they have in common, to discern the common good as one element of their activity, to know better their profound aspirations, and to order their lives together so as to
take their place within the human “ecosystem” (Ryan, 2018: 698). These predisposing conditions, which can help each individual “to actualize their disposition to live in common” (Smith, 1995: 63), may also presuppose minimum political conditions for peaceful coexistence based on a protection of fundamental freedoms and a recognition of rights and duties.

However, the diversity perspective presented in this article has a number of limitations related to the prescriptive dimension of the common good, which leads to ignoring the possibility of the existence of free riders. Sison and Fontrodona (2012: 215) specify that the concept of a common good differs from the public goods in that it “admits no free riders, and each party’s actual contribution is essential to the realization of the good in the first place.” The actual contribution of everyone to the emergence of a common good can appear idealistic: there would be, in all societies, free riders and malicious individuals refusing to participate in the common good. In contrast, this study has striven to demonstrate that this new perspective is eminently realistic, because it invites us to refocus on actual communities, however small they may be, fulfilling the aforementioned conditions allowing for the emergence of a common good. Building and fostering “mini human ecosystems” based on friendship while admitting no free riders may be the most efficient means to develop communities that the other members of an organization or of a society concerned with the pursuit of the common good might wish to join.

In addition, the common good principle may lead to underestimating the tensions the personal goods are aimed at. The question is how we can make sure that no personal good is excluded or overlooked. But in the field of diversity, the pursuit of certain personal goods may, on the contrary, foster the development of further personal goods. For example, the implementation of work conditions encouraging autonomy, clear objectives, guidance, cooperation, and mutual assistance, and therefore allowing the subsidiary exercise of authority is likely to facilitate the integration of all the minorities and identities, avoiding an excessive focus on some individuals or on some categories of individuals.

Criticism could also be expressed with regard to the fact that an overarching and comprehensive diversity perspective would risk being perceived as overbearing. As Nussbaum (2001: 36) acknowledged, it is always “problematic to use concepts that originate in one culture to describe and assess realities in another.” Nevertheless, this diversity perspective does not replace the existing approaches and does not claim that a cooperation based on the common good principle between individuals with different attributes is always possible. It rather states that a common good requires “enough consensus that people are able to have extended conversations about morality from which moral progress may emerge” (Werhane, 1994: 287). I would say, then, that cooperation is conceivable irrespective of the degree or the nature of diversity, if there is a shared human willingness to contribute to common good and an implementation of general and specific predisposing conditions as defined in this article.

A first avenue for future research would be to explore how diversity programs based on the common good principle could enable heterogeneous groups to cooperate in better conditions. A longitudinal approach could be used to consider the different points of view of the members of the organization regarding the diversity programs,
which seek to implement subsidiarity management, a teleological view, and schemes for valuing mutual support and solidarity. This investigation could address the question of how every member of the organization can participate in these programs without feeling excluded or aggrieved. It could also examine the extent to which these diversity programs are necessarily linked to the intervention of a leader who would wish to develop and diffuse humanistic management (Melé, 2003).

A second possible path for future research would consist in enriching this theoretical corpus on the practical usefulness of common good. The common good principle can found humanistic firms (Sison & Fontrodona, 2012), humanistic economic movements, such as conscious capitalism and economy of communion (Frémeaux & Michelson, 2017), and, as has been demonstrated in this article, a humanistic perspective of diversity. Future studies could address other ethical topics close to organizational reality, such as corporate social responsibility, liberation, or sustainable development, on which the concept of a common good could shed additional light. I think that pursuit of community embeddedness, implementation of cooperation arenas, shared search for transcendental objectives, support to employees, colleagues and superiors, and solidarity within and beyond teams might be valuable resources to avoid an exclusive or excessive focus on individual freedom and responsibility. I would advise future researchers to commence with an analysis of the existing literature on the theme chosen in order to ascertain exactly the theoretical and practical contribution of a common-good-based perspective.

**CONCLUSION**

Given that “the common good entails cooperation to promote conditions which enhance the opportunity for the human flourishing of all people within a community” (Melé, 2009: 227), it offers a comprehensive perspective of diversity: a diversity program is a set of conditions that help employees with different characteristics to work together by participating in a community good, human development, and the personal good of each member of the community.

This new perspective of diversity has three main ethical advantages: 1) it allows a combination of the different community levels, connecting them by subsidiarity; 2) it embraces all the fields—moral, social, and economic—connecting them by a teleological hierarchy; and 3) it avoids the risk of exclusion by generating a strong sense of solidarity. This perspective may also constitute a buffer against the risks of identitarian closure, of instrumentalization of diversity or of exclusion that, despite their best intentions, diversity management programs can magnify. It focuses on human development as the only objective of diversity, thus enabling each member of a community to become a little more human.

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